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   Abstract 
 
 
This study documents a general decline in the volatility of employment growth 
during the period 1960 to 2002 and examines its possible sources.  A unique aspect of the 
analysis is the use of state-level panel data.  Estimates from a pooled cross-section/time-
series model indicate that aggregate and state-level factors each explain an important 
share of the total variation in state-level volatility.  Specifically, state-level factors have 
contributed as much as 29 percent, while aggregate factors are found to account for up to 
45 percent of the variation.  With regard to state-level factors, the share of state total 
employment in manufacturing and state banking deregulation each contributed 
significantly to fluctuations in volatility.  Among the aggregate factors separately 
identified, monetary policy, changes in the inventory-to-sales ratio, changes in the ratio 
of total trade to GDP, and oil prices significantly affected state-level volatility, although 
to differing degrees.  
   Employment growth volatility has been marked by three distinct patterns during 
the past 50 years.  One is a substantial long-run decline, from about 0.7 percent per 
quarter in 1957 to about 0.2 percent in 2005.  A second is the erratic pattern of the 
decline; periods of sharp decreases in volatility have alternated with periods of substantial 
increases.  For example, volatility fell sharply between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, 
rose markedly from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, and declined sharply after the mid-
1980s.  A third pattern is the considerable cross-state variation in the extent of the 
declines.  While volatility in most states has decreased, some states have experienced 
drops that exceed 60 percent and others have had declines of only 14 percent.  Volatility 
actually rose in two states. 
There is a large literature that examines the volatility pattern of aggregate 
economic variables and considers their determinants. However, there are few studies that 
use state level data to better understand the factors driving volatility. In this regard, we 
first document the variations in employment growth volatility across states since the mid 
1950s.  We then apply panel regression techniques to identify underlying sources of the 
fluctuations in volatility.  The regressions are structured to capture the effects of 
aggregate factors, state-specific responses to aggregate factors, and idiosyncratic state 
developments, both time varying and time invariant.   
We find that aggregate and state-level factors separately explain important shares 
of the total variation in state-level volatility.  Specifically, aggregate factors are found to 
account for up to 45 percent of the variation, while state-level factors have contributed as 
much as 29 percent.   Among the aggregate factors separately identified, monetary policy, 
changes in the inventory-to-sales ratio, changes in the ratio of total trade to GDP, and oil 
  1prices significantly affected state-level volatility, although to differing degrees.  These 
findings support aggregate studies that have identified important roles for improved 
monetary policy and inventory management techniques in increased macroeconomic 
stability.  In addition, we find that each of the aggregate factors has had significantly 
different state impacts.  With regard to state-level factors, the share of state total 
employment in manufacturing and state banking deregulation each contributed 
significantly to fluctuations in volatility.  
We believe the addition of state-level data to the analysis of volatility provides a 
number of benefits compared to using aggregate data alone.  One benefit is the greater 
number of  samples (48 for states compared with one in an aggregate study) afforded by 
using state-level data and the corresponding additional dispersion that allows more 
precise estimation of factors thought to influence fluctuations in volatility.   Another 
benefit is the lack of endogeneity issues that can plague aggregate studies.  For example, 
studies that attempt to attribute volatility changes to shifts in monetary policy need to 
separate the impacts of policy from the reaction of policymakers.  Since monetary policy 
does not react to individual state-level developments, the issue of endogeneity is much 
less of a concern in a state-level analysis of volatility.  Additionally, in aggregate studies 
any unobserved heterogeneity among states that affects volatility will be subsumed in the 
regression’s error term.  This unobserved state heterogeneity could lead to omitted 
variable bias if the error term is correlated with an included regressor.  State deregulation 
of banking markets is a relevant example of how such omitted variable bias might work.   
Deregulation began in the late 1970s, the same period in which monetary policy was 
thought to have improved.  Stock and Watson (2002), for example, attributed 20 percent 
  2to 30 percent of reduced volatility since the mid-1980s to improved monetary policy.  Yet 
deregulation itself could have led to greater aggregate stability, and so failure to control 
for the effect of deregulation on volatility can cause the contribution of monetary policy 
to be overstated.  The use of state-level data allows us to account for banking 
deregulation, something that is difficult to do when using aggregate data.  Not all states 
deregulated their banking markets at the same time, and the staggered timing allows us to 
identify the effects of banking deregulation on volatility.  Finally, rather than simply 
restricting aggregate forces to having the same impact on every state, the use of state-
level data permits a test of whether the aggregate factors have differential state impacts, a 
phenomenon documented in other studies [e.g., Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999)].   
 
Measuring State-Level Employment Growth Volatility 
    The study focuses on employment growth because it is a widely used indicator 
of real activity, is available quarterly, and extends sufficiently far back in time to track 
longer-run movements in the series.  Real state GDP was considered; however, consistent 
and reliable data are available beginning only in 1977.  State personal income data exist 
for the entire study period but only in nominal terms. 
  This study measures state-level volatility following the approach in Morgan, 
Rime and Strahan (2004).  Specifically, the quarterly growth rate of state employment 
growth is regressed on state dummies ( ) and time period dummies ( ) for the period 
1956:3 to 2005:3: 
i a t a
  ( 1 )   it 0 Employment growth it aaa i t ε = +++. 
 Volatility is then measured as the absolute value of the regression error, 
  3  ( 2 )   it Volatility it ε = . 
The volatility measure thus constitutes the deviation of employment growth in a given 
state-quarter from the average growth for a given state and from average growth in all 
states in a given quarter.
1  Our data are quarterly nonagricultural payroll employment 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
  The estimated equation has an adjusted R
2 of 0.9588.  F tests indicate that both 
the state fixed effects are jointly significant (p < 0.00) and significantly different from 
each other (p < 0.00).  F tests also reveal that the same results obtain for the time 
dummies:  they are jointly significant (p < 0.00) and significantly different from each 
other (p < 0.00). 
Figure 1 shows the average volatility of U.S. quarterly employment growth.
2   As 
can be seen employment growth volatility exhibited three distinct trends during the 1960 
to 2002 period.  Initially, volatility fell around 45 percent during the 1960s from a high of 
0.67 in 1962 to 0.37 in 1971.  Employment growth volatility then reversed its downward 
trend, rising to around 0.6 in 1978. This rise in volatility coincides with the generally 
poor economic conditions of the 1970s, a time during which the economy experienced 
rising inflation and slow growth.  From the early 1980s on, however, volatility generally 
declined, dropping about 50 percent to 0.3 in 2002, as economic performance improved 
relative to the 1970s.  Although most studies have concentrated on the final period of 
declining volatility, we believe that there is much to be gained by incorporating the 
fluctuations that occurred prior to the mid-1980s.  Expanding the analysis to the whole 
                                                 
1 Alternatively, volatilities can be computed using rolling standard errors or regression standard errors from 
rolling AR(1) models [e.g., Blanchard and Simon (2001).]  As will be seen, using rolling standard errors 
complicates the panel data approach taken in the paper.   
 
2  The volatility series is smoothed using an eight-quarter moving average. 
  4period thus adds valuable information about volatility that allows better identification of 
its underlying sources. 
  Because the data have a time-series dimension, two concerns must be addressed.  
First, it is necessary to check for stationarity in the estimated it ε . Two alternative panel 
unit root tests were performed.  The first is the technique of Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002), 
which restricts all states to a common unit root.  The second, developed by Im, Pesaran, 
and Shin (2003), allows the unit root process to vary across states.  Both tests were done 
with and without trends.  All regressions include four lags of the dependent variable to 
account for autocorrelation.  The nulls of unit root processes were rejected in all cases at 
the 1 percent level. 
  Second, as was mentioned, many researchers have identified a break in volatility 
of the aggregate economy that occurred around 1984 [e.g., Kim and Nelson (1999), Stock 
and Watson (2002), and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000).]  Alternatively, Owyang 
and Wall (2005) present evidence of structural breaks in state-level employment growth 
volatility that occurred at widely differing dates.  We therefore tested each of the state 
volatility series for the possibility of a structural break using the Andrews-Ploberger 
(1994) test for a linear regression.  Each state series is modeled as an AR(1) process.  The 
test involves splitting the sample into two sub-periods for a given break date.  A Chow 
test statistic is then calculated to test the equality of coefficients before and after the 
break.  This is done for all possible break dates so as to identify the break endogenously.  
A structural break is identified by the break date with the largest test statistic value.  
Significance is determined using values tabulated by Andrews-Ploberger (1994).  
  5  The Andrews-Ploberger tests indicate structural breaks in all but five of the state 
series.
3 The results are displayed in Table 1.  The table contains the identified break dates 
for each state, along with each state’s average volatility in the periods before and after the 
state’s identified break date.  The declines in volatility were widespread across states, 
with volatility in only two states – New York and Texas – rising (Table 1).  The sizes of 
the declines varied considerably. The largest and smallest percent declines differ by a 
factor of five, with Nevada showing the largest decline (66 percent) and New Hampshire 
and Utah the smallest (13 percent).    
  The information in the Table 1 is reproduced in the form of distributions in Figure 
2 and Figure 3.  Figure 2 shows a histogram of the break dates.  Consistent with Owyang 
and Wall (2005), the findings reveal considerable variation in break dates across states, 
emphasizing the value of examining trends in volatility at the sub-national level.  The 
earliest break dates occurred in 1964 (Utah, Pennsylvania, and Mississippi), while the 
latest occurred in 1996 (Nevada). The majority of structural breaks occurred between the 
early 1980s and the early 1990s.  The median break date was found to be 1985:2, roughly 
consistent with the structural break date identified in studies of macroeconomic volatility.   
  Figure 3 displays kernel density estimates of the frequency distributions for the 
average state-level volatilities in the periods before and after the break dates identified for 
each state.
4  The frequency distributions illustrate a key property of volatility over the 
                                                 
3 The five states with no identifiable breaks are Georgia, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New Jersey, and 
South Carolina. 
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  6sample period: the distribution of state-level employment growth volatilities shifted 
markedly to the left.  That is, state employment growth volatility has decreased.  The 
cross-state average volatility fell by over 40 percent, from 0.52 in the pre-break period to 
0.30 during the post-break period.   
 
III. Sources of State-Level Employment Growth Volatility 
  Having documented the substantial and disparate declines in state employment 
growth volatility, this section turns to an examination of the possible sources.  As 
mentioned earlier, the fact that most states experienced volatility declines during the 
sample period suggests that part of the variance might be due to common state responses 
to aggregate shocks.  A large literature has identified several possible factors that have 
influenced volatility in the postwar period.  Stock and Watson (2002) group these factors 
into three broad categories.  One category comprises improved macroeconomic policy, in 
particular improved monetary policy, and shifts in its anti-inflationary stance [Clarida, 
Gali, and Gertler (2000), Orphanides (2001), Leduc, Sill, and Stark (2007), Stock and 
Watson (2002), Leduc and Sill (2007)].  The second category considers structural change 
in the economy. Potential sources of structural change that have been identified in the 
literature include changes in industrial composition, such as a shift from manufacturing to 
services [Blanchard and Simon (2001)], changes in inventory control practices 
[McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2003)], 
changes in the stability of total factor productivity growth and labor productivity [Stock 
and Watson (2002) and Leduc and Sill (2007)], innovations in financial markets 
                                                                                                                                                 
where n is the number of observations in the sample and h is the bandwidth. The points at which the density 
is estimated are indicated by x and the data by Xj. The estimates use the Gaussian kernel and an optimal 
bandwidth that minimizes the mean integrated square error. 
  7[Blanchard and Simon (2001)], and increased economic integration via expanded trade 
[Gordon (2005)].  Good luck in the form of smaller shocks hitting the economy is the 
third category identified by Stock and Watson (2002).   
  In addition to common state response to aggregate shocks it’s likely that states 
have their own unique response to common aggregate shocks. For example, Carlino and 
DeFina (1998, 1999) document that common monetary policy shocks caused differential 
responses in employment and income across states, responses that varied systematically 
with the states’ industrial structures.  An advantage of this study is that we allow states to 
respond differentially to common national shocks.  It’s also likely is that unique state-
level forces, such as differences in laws, industrial structures, labor force compositions 
and other demographic dimensions of the population, could account for some of the 
cross-state variation in volatility.  To the extent that these unique state-level forces are 
time invariant, we can use state fixed-effects to account for them. 
  States can also undergo unique changes over time that affect volatility.  State 
banking deregulation that began in the late 1970s is an important case in point.  Interstate 
banking may have smoothed credit flows and made state economies much less sensitive 
to the fortunes of their own banks.  However, states deregulated their banks at different 
dates, causing volatility in state economic activity to change asynchronously [Morgan, 
Rime, and Strahan (2004).]
5   Similarly, state-specific changes in industrial structure or 
demographic shifts due, say, to immigration, can potentially alter the time series profile 
of a state’s employment growth volatility. 
                                                 
5 In 1978, Maine was the first state to pass a law that allowed entry by bank holding companies from any 
state that reciprocated by allowing Maine banks to enter their banking markets.  Following Maine’s lead, 
states deregulated in waves, with the bulk of states approving legislation to allow deregulation between 
1985 and 1988. With the exception of Hawaii, all states allowed interstate banking by 1993. 
  8  Accounting for idiosyncratic aspects of state economies is important not only 
because it can help to explain state-level employment volatility changes, but also because 
not doing so can lead to an overestimate of the impact of national factors.  Stock and 
Watson (2002), for example, attributed 20 percent to 30 percent of reduced volatility 
since the mid-1980s to improved monetary policy, while Leduc and Sill (2007) place the 
estimate at about 15 percent.  But financial deregulation occurred at roughly the same 
time that monetary policy is supposed to have improved.  Since deregulation itself might 
have lowered state-level employment volatility [Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004)] and 
since it is not possible to control for state-level financial deregulation using aggregate 
data, monetary policy’s role in lowering volatility may have been overstated.  
  In sum, state-level employment growth volatility could have been driven by 
states’ common responses to aggregate shocks, states’ differential responses to aggregate 
shocks, as well as state-specific forces.  The next section develops an empirical approach 
designed to capture these three broad determinants of volatility. 
 
IV. Empirical Model and Estimation 
  The analysis in this study uses a two-way fixed effects (state and time) panel data 
model to analyze quarterly data on state employment growth volatility for the period 
1960 to 2002.
6  State-level volatility is measured as in equation (2).
7  Because the 
volatility series are stationary they are used in level form.  Explanatory variables include 
                                                 
6 A Hausman test indicated that a two-way fixed effects specification, both for time and states, was 
preferred to a two-way random effects specification.   
7 Alternatively, volatility could be measured using 20-quarter rolling standard errors as others have [e.g., 
Blanchard and Simon (2001)].  However, this approach complicates the econometric analysis as it results in 
overlapping samples and artificially builds autoregressive patterns in the data. To mitigate this problem, it 
would be necessary to construct non-overlapping samples of volatilities, which would limit the panel to 
eight separate periods, insufficient for the analysis undertaken in this paper.  
 
  9aggregate and state-level factors.  All aggregate factors are permitted to have distinct 
state-level effects.    
  Aggregate variables.  An advantage of a panel approach is that we can account 
for the common effect of all aggregate forces on state volatility using time fixed effects.  
The model is specified so that macro policy (monetary policy) and structural change (e.g., 
changes in inventory control practices and changes in the stability of labor productivity 
growth) and openness to foreign trade, each have a differential effect on state volatility.  
This is accomplished by interacting each of the aggregate variables to be identified with 
the state dummy variables. Additionally, the price of oil, interacted with state dummy 
variables, is included in our empirical model given its historically important role in 
macroeconomic performance [Hamilton (1983, 1996, and 2003)].   
  Monetary policy is measured using the federal funds rate, which is standard.  
Following Hamilton (2003), the oil price shock at time t is measured as the net oil price 
increase over the previous 12 months. Denote the spot price of West Texas Intermediate 
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This measure of oil-price shocks appears to demonstrate a more stable link to real activity 
then does the actual price of crude oil over the postwar sample.   Productivity growth is 
calculated as the log difference of labor productivity, obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  The trade variable equals the sum of nominal imports and exports divided by 
nominal GDP.  The trade ratio has trended up over time, so the series was first-
differenced for use in the estimations.  Inventory management methods are proxied using 
  10the inventory-to-sales ratio.  The series trended up and then plateaued in the sample 
period and so was also first-differenced to ensure stationarity. 
  The time series of the aggregate variables are shown in Figures 4 through 7.  
Examination of these figures reveals that the series appears stationary and therefore 
appropriate for use in the estimations.  In addition, the volatility of each series has fallen 
over time, suggesting a possible role for these variables in the state-level volatility 
declines. 
  State-level variables.   An additional advantage of a panel approach is that we can 
use state fixed effects to account for time invariant idiosyncratic state level factors that 
can influence state volatility.  As is common, the impacts of all aggregate forces on state 
volatility are captured using time fixed effects.  Time invariant state-level influences are 
modeled using state fixed effects.  As we have indicated, a state’s industrial structure and 
financial deregulation are two important forces that have varied over time.  Each state’s 
manufacturing employment as a share of its total employment is used to capture changing 
industrial structure.  Likewise, we use a set of state-specific dummies to indicate when a 
state allowed interstate banking.  The dummies equal zero before a state experienced 
financial deregulation and unity otherwise.  The dates of state-level deregulation are from 
Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004).  Finally, the model includes state-specific time trends 
to capture state factors that change gradually over time, such as demographic shifts in 
state populations.   
  Empirical specification. The sample consists of quarterly data covering the period 
1960 to 2002.
8  The sample contains 8,256 observations: 172 quarters of data for 48 
                                                 
8 Owing to the conversion of the industrial classification coding system to NAICS, consistent data for 
manufacturing share are available only through 2002.   
  11states. Contemporaneous and lagged values of each explanatory variable are used to 
allow for delayed or persistent impacts.  Moreover, the model permits both the intercept 
and the slope coefficients to take different values for each state and, for a given state, 
different values before and after the structural break dates identified for each state’s 
volatility series. 
 The model takes the form (abstracting from the lags): 
(3)          
47
0, , , 1
47 4
,, , 11
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(1 )( )
it i i t t i i i i t i t i t i
mi it i mt i t im
state break T break manshare dreg
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where: it ε  is the absolute value of quarterly employment growth fluctuations; t indexes 
time (quarters), i indexes the 48 states, and m indexes the subset of aggregate explanatory 
variables to be estimated; breaki,t is a dummy variable, taking the value 0 before a state’s 
identified break date and 1 after;  t α is a quarterly time dummy; Ti is a time trend for state 
i; statei is a dummy variable equal to 1 for state i and 0 otherwise;  is the share 
of state i’s total employment in manufacturing; dregi,t is the deregulation dummy for state 
i; and,
, it manshare
t Z  is the set of national variables that are interacted with the statei. 
  Estimation and Results.  Coefficients for equation (3) are obtained using a robust 
OLS estimator.
9  A series of regressions were run to determine the appropriate lag length 
for each variable.
10  Based on the results from these regressions, four lags of the oil price 
                                                 
9 We estimated the model using a Prais-Winsten estimator that corrects for both state-level 
heteroskedasticity and state-specific first-order serial correlation.  The result for the robust OLS regressions 
are virtually identical to those obtained using the Prais-Winsten estimator.  We choose the robust OLS 
estimation since it is appropriate for the accounting exercise conducted in this analysis.     
10The usual AIC or BIC could not be used due to the panel structure of the data.  Instead we estimated 
equation 3 without the state interactions on the macro variables, using five lags of each macro variable and 
of the state manufacturing share.  State interactions are ignored so that average effect can be measured.  
The contemporaneous plus all lags up to the maximum significant lag for a variable were used.  For 
  12variable, three lags of the manufacturing share, federal funds rate and change in the 
inventory-to-sales ratio, and two lags of the change in the total trade ratio are used, along 
with their contemporaneous values.
11
Due to the large number of state interactions, lags, and state and time fixed 
effects, it is not practical to display the individual estimated coefficients.  Instead, results 
are summarized in the form of F tests.  Test statistics are shown in Table 2 for both the 
joint significance and equality of coefficient values for each of the variables in the model.   
As can be seen, each state-level variable is found to be jointly significant at the 1 
percent level.  Similarly, F tests for the equality of coefficients are rejected for each 
variable in the model.  These findings are especially interesting since previous studies of 
volatility have ignored state-level influences.  They are also interesting particularly with 
regard to deregulation and manufacturing shares.  The joint significance of the 
deregulation dummies (F = 4.31) provides new support for the findings of Morgan, Rime, 
and Strahan (2004) in that the present model has considerably more controls than theirs. 
In addition, Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) restricted deregulation to have the same 
effect on each state.  As already indicated, our results show that these restrictions are 
unwarranted. An F test of the null hypothesis of the equality of 48 estimated coefficients 
on the deregulation variable is soundly rejected (F = 4.36). 
The finding that the manufacturing shares variables are jointly significant and 
significantly different from one another is notable since, to our knowledge, no other study 
has found changing industrial structure to be correlated with increased stability of the of 
                                                                                                                                                 
instance, if the fourth lag of the oil price was significant, the contemporaneous through the fourth lag were 
included in the estimation. 
11 Neither the contemporaneous value nor any lags of labor productivity growth were significant; hence, the 
variable was excluded from all regression.  
  13the economy.  The inability of previous studies to uncover a significant correlation 
between declining manufacturing share and greater economic stability might reflect the 
past focus on explaining the one-time structural aggregate break identified in the mid-
1980s.  Manufacturing employment shares have been decreasing steadily for decades and 
have not experienced a sudden one-time decrease.  So while they might not reasonably 
explain a one-time change in volatility, they do appear to have contributed to the longer 
run, more continuous, volatility changes examined in this study. 
The results also offer support for the aggregate variables.  The time dummy 
variables are jointly significant (F = 2.74) and significantly different from one another (F 
= 2.72).  In addition, the results in Table 2 indicate that changes in monetary policy, 
fluctuations in oil prices, increased international trade, and improved inventory 
management techniques have all had differential effects on state level volatility.  
Importantly, these aggregate variables matter even when all are simultaneously 
considered.  The results also validate the initial determination of the break dates for each 
of the states based on the Andrews-Ploberger tests.  The break variables themselves are 
highly significant, indicating that the structural break partly took the form of a shift in the 
average levels of state volatility.  In addition, the interactions of the break variables with 
the federal funds rate, state manufacturing employment share, the change in the 
inventory-to-sales ratio, oil prices, and the total trade ratio are similarly significant.   
 The findings discussed so far establish the statistical significance of both state-
level and aggregate influences on state employment volatility, and the importance of 
recognizing states’ differential responses to aggregate factors.  The question remains as to 
  14the economic significance of the factors.  That is, how much of the actual variance in 
state-level employment volatility do the different variables account for? 
    Accounting for volatility.  An answer to the question is provided with a number of 
auxiliary regressions, which are used to generate bounds on the size of the contributions 
of each variable or subset of variables. Consider the following auxiliary regression for 
state-specific factors.   
(4) 
47
0, , , 1 (1 ) (1 ) i t i it i i i it it it i t i state break T break manshare dreg , ε αβ ν
= =+ + + + + + + ψ ∑  
Equation (4) contains only the state-specific factors (statei, Ti, statei*mansharei,t and 
dregi,t)  as explanatory variables, allowing all coefficients to differ before and after the 
estimated state break dates. The R
2 from this regression gives the upper bound for the 
contribution of the state-specific factors, since all co-variance between them and the 
excluded aggregate variables is allocated to the state-specific factors.  We refer to the R
2 
from Equation (4) as
2
U R .  
  An estimate of the lower bound for the contribution of state-specific factors is 
generated by estimating a second auxiliary regression that includes only the interacted 
macroeconomic variables and the time dummies, again allowing coefficients to vary 
across the break dates.  The R
2 from this equation, called
2
M R , maximizes the measured 
contribution of the macro variables since all co-variance with the now excluded state-
specific factors is ascribed to the aggregate variables.  Thus, subtracting 
2
M R  from the R
2 
of the full equation,
2
ALL R , yields the lower bound for state-specific variables, referred to 
as
2




M R RR =− ).  An analogous exercise is conducted to get the upper bound 
  15and lower-bound for the contribution of the macroeconomic variables (statei*Zm,t and αt,) 
and for individual state-level and aggregate variables.  
The results of this exercise are shown in Tables 3 and 4.  Table 3 presents estimates 
of the combined effects of the macro variables versus the combined effects of state-level 
variables.  Panel A of the table presents the
2
ALL R  for the full equation and for the 
equations that contain only state-specific variables and macro variables, respectively.  
2
ALL R indicates the full model explains 57 percent of the total variation in state-level 
employment volatility.  The R
2s for the state-specific and macro variables give the 
maximum contributions of each set of variables.  As described above, subtracting each of 
these from the total 
2
ALL R  yields the minimum contribution of each set of variables.  The 
results of these calculations are shown in Panel B of the table. 
As can be seen, the range of potential contributions from the state-specific factors is 
11 percent to 29 percent.  The range of contributions for the macroeconomic variables is 
between 27 percent and 45 percent of the total variation in employment growth volatility.  
Consequently, macro variables have likely played a more important role than the state-
specific factors.  However, the contributions of state-specific factors, which have 
received little attention in the volatility literature, appear important.  At a minimum, state-
specific factors account for about 20 percent of the total explained variation in volatility 
(11%/57%).   
Table 4 contains the range of contributions of each of the individual variables used in 
the regression.  Among the macro variables, monetary policy accounts for between 8 
  16percent and 24 percent of the variation.
12  The range for monetary policy is similar to the 
estimated explanatory power of monetary policy found by Stock and Watson (2002) and 
Leduc and Sill (2007) when examining the post-1984 decline in GDP volatility.  The 
change in the inventory-to-sales ratio accounts for between 6 percent and 11 percent, 
while oil prices explain around 5 percent to 14 percent.  Thus, they each appear to play a 
relatively important role.  This finding complements those of McConnell and Quiros-
Perez (2000) and Kahn, McConnell, and Quiros-Perez (2002) who find a significant role 
for inventory-to-sales ratio in explaining the structural break in aggregate volatility.  The 
change in the total trade ratio accounts for somewhat less variation, about 2 percent to 7 
percent. 
The results show that each of the state-level variables potentially has played an 
important role.  The change in states’ manufacturing shares could explain up to 17 
percent, while deregulation of interstate banking could explain an additional 9 percent.  
State fixed effects account for between 2 percent and 13 percent, while the state-specific 
time trends explain between 1 percent and 12 percent. The results once again suggest the 
importance of incorporating state-level factors into an analysis of volatility. 
V. Conclusion 
This study documents a general decline in the volatility of employment growth and 
examines some of its possible sources.  A unique aspect of our analysis is the use of state-
level panel data on employment growth during the period 1960 to 2002.  Panel data allow 
a richer analysis than one based only on time series data [e.g., Stock and Watson (2002)] 
                                                 
12 Eight percent is a conservative estimate of the lower bound because our procedure excludes the common 
effect of the federal funds rate on state-level volatility.  The common effect is subsumed in the estimated 
time fixed effects, and is netted out when the lower bound is computed.  Thus, the federal funds rate 
accounts for at least eight percent, but probably more.  The same logic holds for each of the other aggregate 
variables as well.  
  17or alternatively on cross-sectional data [e.g., Hammond and Thompson (2004).]  Indeed, 
the decline in employment growth volatility was found to be widespread across states, 
albeit to differing degrees, suggesting a role for state-specific factors as well as common 
national influences. 
Our analysis, which includes both state-specific and macroeconomic variables, 
indicates that, in fact, each of these factors plays a significant role in explaining 
fluctuations in employment growth volatility.  The range of possible contributions of 
state-specific variables in the full sample was found to be less than that of the macro 
variables but nonetheless important.  Among the aggregate factors separately identified, 
monetary policy, changes in the inventory-to-sales ratio, changes in the ratio of total trade 
to GDP, and oil prices significantly affected state-level volatility, although to differing 
degrees.  
With regard to state-level factors, the share of state total employment in 
manufacturing and state banking deregulation each contributed significantly to 
fluctuations in volatility.  These variables were found to matter even after controlling for 
state fixed effects and state-specific time trends.  In sum these findings show that sub-
national data can be important for understanding the variety of forces that buffet both 
state and national economies.   
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  20Table 1: Structural Break Dates for State Volatility Series
* 
  
State Break  Date 






(Post vs. Pre) 
AL 1983Q3  0.34  0.20  -0.42 
AR 1984Q3  0.46  0.25  -0.45 
AZ 1992Q4  0.65  0.29  -0.55 
CA 1981Q3  0.36  0.27  -0.26 
CO 1988Q2  0.54  0.25  -0.54 
CT 1994Q1  0.43  0.24  -0.45 
DE 1977Q1  0.78  0.43  -0.44 
FL 1980Q3  0.57  0.29  -0.49 
IA 1991Q3  0.41  0.16  -0.61 
ID 1980Q1  0.62  0.44  -0.29 
IL 1990Q3  0.35  0.17  -0.52 
IN 1982Q1  0.58  0.28  -0.51 
KS 1979Q2  0.52  0.27  -0.49 
KY 1984Q3  0.53  0.21  -0.59 
LA 1985Q2  0.59  0.39  -0.34 
MD 1986Q4  0.42  0.29  -0.30 
ME 1993Q1  0.45  0.26  -0.42 
MI 1971Q1  1.12  0.45  -0.60 
MN 1987Q1  0.34  0.17  -0.49 
MO 1986Q3  0.32  0.18  -0.44 
MS 1964Q2  0.58  0.33  -0.42 
MT 1992Q1  0.66  0.38  -0.43 
ND 1986Q4  0.67  0.32  -0.52 
NE 1985Q4  0.44  0.25  -0.43 
NH 1989Q2  0.48  0.41  -0.13 
NM 1975Q3  0.61  0.33  -0.47 
NV 1996Q4  0.70  0.24  -0.66 
NY 1971Q2  0.25  0.34  0.34 
OH 1988Q2  0.41  0.17  -0.59 
OK 1986Q3  0.54  0.31  -0.42 
OR 1983Q3  0.54  0.27  -0.50 
PA 1964Q2  0.56  0.25  -0.55 
RI 1991Q1  0.51  0.41  -0.21 
SD 1992Q1  0.54  0.23  -0.57 
TN 1982Q1  0.38  0.24  -0.36 
TX 1979Q2  0.32  0.37  0.17 
UT 1964Q1  0.50  0.43  -0.13 
VA 1991Q3  0.33  0.21  -0.36 
VT 1991Q3  0.49  0.23  -0.54 
WA 1979Q2  0.62  0.33  -0.47 
WI 1992Q2  0.32  0.14  -0.55 
WV 1978Q2  0.79  0.61  -0.22 
WY 1985Q3  0.95  0.58  -0.39 
 * Volatility in Georgia, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New Jersey, and South Carolina did not 
exhibit structural breaks.
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Table 2: F Tests for the Estimated Coefficients
† 
 
Variable  F Test for Joint 
Significance 
F Test for Equality of 
Coefficients 
state dummies  4.89***  4.99*** 
    
time dummies  2.74***  2.72*** 
    
state-specific break dummies  5.80***  5.94*** 
    
state-specific time trends  2.70***  2.75*** 
state-specific time trends 
interacted with  break  3.82*** 3.59*** 
    
state-specific deregulation 
dummies  4.31*** 4.36*** 
    
federal funds rate  2.01***  2.05*** 
federal funds rate interacted with 
break  4.10*** 4.20*** 
    
Hamilton oil price index   2.27***  2.15*** 
Hamilton oil price index 
interacted with break  3.02*** 3.09*** 
    
change in state-specific 
manufacturing shares  2.85*** 2.69*** 
change in state-specific 
manufacturing shares interacted 
with  break 
6.34*** 6.45*** 
    
change in ratio of total trade to 
GDP  1.77*** 1.80*** 
change in total trade ratio 
interacted with break  4.19*** 4.29*** 
    
change in inventory-to-sales ratio  1.82***  1.85*** 
change in inventory-to-sales ratio 
interacted with break  3.51*** 3.55*** 
 
† *** indicate significance at the 1 percent levels. 
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Table 3:  The Contribution of National vs. State-specific Variables to 
Employment Volatility 





Full equation  0.5666      
Only state-specific variables
















11.3 percent to 29.3 percent 
 
27.4 percent to 45.3 percent 
 
 
a The state-specific regression includes state fixed effects, break dummies, state-specific time trends, 
deregulation dummies, and manufacturing share of total state employment, both alone and multiplied by 
the state-specific break dummies.   
 
b The national  regression includes the time fixed effects and the interacted macro variables, both alone and 
multiplied by the state-specific break dummies.  
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Table 4:  Accounting for Employment 
Volatility in the Full Sample 
(1960:2 to 2002:4) 
 
Equation specification
a  Contribution to Volatility 
State variables   
State fixed effects only  1.8 percent to 12.5 percent 
State-specific time trends  1.2 percent to 11.8 percent 
Deregulation 2.1  percent to 9.4 percent 
Change in state manufacturing employment share  5.2 percent to 16.7 percent 
National variables   
Time fixed effects only  3.3 percent to  13.3 percent 
Federal funds rate    7.5 percent to 23.9 percent 
Oil prices  5.3 percent to 13.5 percent 
Change in inventory-to-sales ratio  5.5 percent to 11.0 percent 
Change in ratio of total trade to GDP  2.1 percent to 7.2 percent 
 
  











































































































































1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
year
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
  31